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TAX RATES AND TAX EVASION: EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA 
AMNESTY DATA** 
STEVEN E. CRANE* AND FARROKH NOURZAD* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect of mar-
ginal tax rates on income ta:x evasion us-
ing data from the California Ta:x Amnesty 
Program. After correcting for the selectiv-
ity bias, we find that evaders respond to 
higher ta:x rates by increasing their eva-
sion activity. We also find that individu-
als with higher levels of income tend to 
evade more. Further, the absolute and rel-
ative sizes of both of these effects depend 
upon the scope of the evasion measure used. 
Finally, evasion is generally inelastic with 
respect to changes in both marginal ta:x 
rates and income, with the former elastic-
ities tending to be larger. 
I. Introduction 
TAX rat~s have been w~dely recognized as a primary determmant of income 
tax evasion. In fact, one argument in fa-
vor of cutting marginal tax rates has been 
~hat, by inducing greater income report-
mg, lower rates will broaden the tax base. 
While intuitively appealing, this claim has 
not been substantiated by traditional mi-
crotheoretic analyses (e.g., Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972), which have generally 
found that consequences of a tax rate 
change to be, a priori, indeterminate. Re-
cent efforts to analyze this issue in a game 
theoretic context have even resulted in a 
negative relationship between tax rates 
an.d evasion (e.g., Graetz, Reinganum, and 
WIlde, 1986). Empirical analyses have also 
been unable to resolve this issue. Some 
stu~i~s ignore the matter altogether by 
omIttmg tax rates (e.g., Witte and Wood-
bury, 1985). Other studies that do include 
a marginal tax rate variable obtain mixed 
results, ranging from no effect (e.g., 
Slemrod, 1985) to a positive effect (e.g., 
Clotfelter, 1983). Thus further research 
using alternative sources of data is war-
ranted. 
'Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
53233. 
In this paper we examine the impact of 
marginal tax rates on income tax evasion 
using data from the California Income Tax 
Amnesty Program. Amnesty data repre-
sent a new source of micro data which al-
lows construction of direct measures of tax 
evasion. However, the selectivity bias in-
herent in such data requires special 
econometric treatment. This involves us-
ing a maximum likelihood technique that 
incorporates not only the variables influ-
encing the evasion decision, but also those 
influencing the subsequent decision to 
participate in the amnesty program. Our 
findings indicate that, after controlling for 
the effects of other relevant variables 
there is a statistically significant positiv~ 
relation from marginal tax rates to alter-
native measures of evasion. 
.The remainder of this paper is orga-
nIzed as follows. In the next section some 
general background regarding existing 
theoretical and empirical work on the tax 
rate effect is provided. This is followed by 
Section III which contains a discussion of 
the features of the sample data employed 
in this study. In Section IV, we present a 
description of the variables used in our 
empirical model. The estimation proce-
dure is outlined in Section V, followed by 
a discussion of our findings in Section VI. 
The final section provides a summary of 
this work and offers some suggestions for 
further research. 
II. Background 
Since the classic work by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), the standard approach to 
analyzing the individual's evasion deci-
sion has been to use a portfolio-choice 
framework in which the optimal level of 
evasion is obtained from maximizing ex-
pected utility of income after taxes and 
penalties. Using this approach, four fac-
tors have been commonly found to affect 
the decision to evade. These are the in-
dividual's true income, the tax rate, the 
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probability that the evader is detected, and 
the penalty rate to which detected evad-
ers are subjected. In most cases, a positive 
relationship between the level of evasion 
and the individual's true income, and 
negative relations with both of the com-
pliance policy tools are obtained. With re-
spect to the tax rate, however, most models 
have been unable to determine an un-
ambiguous relation. l 
This ambiguity is due to the fact that 
a change in the tax rate exerts two op-
posing effects on the taxpayer. On the one 
hand, an increase in the tax rate induces 
greater evasion since it increases the 
marginal return to successful evasion (the 
substitution effect). On the other hand, by 
reducing disposable income, a higher tax 
rate generates an additional effect (the 
income effect) which may lead to more or 
less evasion depending on the individu-
al's attitude towards risk. To the extent 
that an individual is less willing to take 
risk as his/her after-tax income declines, 
he/she will be less inclined to evade taxes 
when the tax rate increases. Therefore, 
unless risk aversion increases with in-
come, or the substitution effect is strong 
enough to dominate the income effect, one 
obtains the counter-intuitive result that 
higher tax rates lead to reduced evasion, 
or that the effect is indeterminate.2 
More recently, income tax evasion has 
been examined within a game-theoretic 
framework which explicitly recognizes 
strategic aspects of the interaction be-
tween the taxpayer and the tax authority 
(e.g., Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde, 1986; 
Reinganum and Wilde, 1986, 1988). In this 
context, a tax rate change generates an 
additional effect through its impact on the 
marginal return to auditing. It has been 
shown that, under some simplifying as-
sumptions and for certain audit classes, 
this effect dominates the conventional tax 
rate effect leading to a negative overall 
impact (Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde, 
1986). This result holds independently of 
the taxpayer's attitude towards risk. 
It is interesting to note that the one 
prediction that has not been established 
theoretically is the one that casual ob-
servers expect, that higher taxes lead to 
greater evasion. Given this lack of con-
sensus regarding the theoretical and in-
tuitive expectations about the net tax rate 
effect, one is inclined to turn to the em-
pirical evasion literature for evidence. 
Any attempt to conduct an empirical 
investigation of tax evasion must first 
overcome severe measurement difficulties 
as evasion is inherently unobservable. A 
variety of rather innovative approaches 
has been employed to deal with this prob-
lem. Some researchers (e.g., Friedland, 
Maital, and Rutenberg, 1978; Geeroms and 
Wilmots, 1985; Spicer and Becker, 1980) 
have designed experiments or have con-
ducted surveys in order to generate rele-
vant data. Others (e.g., Crane and Nour-
zad, 1986; Tanzi, 1983) have approached 
the problem from a macroeconomic per-
spective. An attempt has even been made 
at developing an evasion index from the 
distribution of tax returns across tax 
brackets (Slemrod, 1985). Only a few au-
thors (e.g., Clotfelter, 1983; Dubin and 
Wilde, 1988; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; 
Witte and Woodbury, 1985) have been able 
to develop direct measures that are rep-
resentative of evasion behavior under ac-
tual tax systems. Of these, only Clotfelter 
has been able to examine the issue at the 
individual level. 
Not all empirical studies of tax evasion 
have addressed the tax rate-evasion issue 
(e.g., Spicer annd Lundstedt, 1976; Witte 
and Woodbury, 1985). Those that have 
considered tax rates have obtained mixed 
results, ranging from no effect (e.g., Geer-
oms and Wilmots, 1985; Klepper and Na-
gin, 1989; Slemrod, 1985) to a significant 
positive effect (e.g., Friedland, Maital, and 
Rutenberg, 1978; Tanzi, 1983; and most 
notably, Clotfelter, 1983). Note that the 
one prediction that has not been sup-
ported empirically is that higher taxes lead 
to lower evasion. Clearly, more research, 
perhaps using data from alternative 
sources, is needed. We believe that data 
from state income tax amnesty programs 
provide a new and thus far unexploited 
opportunity to search for new evidence on 
this issue. 
In what follows we analyze evasion of 
state income taxes in California using data 
from that state's tax amnesty program. In 
doing so, we assume that the decision to 
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evade state income taxes is independent 
of the decision to evade federal taxes. To 
date, no one has examined the possible 
complications that might arise from the 
interaction between these two decisions 
in a framework which incorporates mul-
tiple tax and enforcement systems. Con-
sequently, it is not clear whether we should 
view federal and state income tax evasion 
as substitute or complementary activi-
ties. Furthermore, addressing this issue 
empirically would require matching in-
formation from the individuals' federal 
returns. Unfortunately, we were unable 
to gain access to these returns. 
III. The California State Income Tax 
Amnesty Program 
Following a number of other states, 
California introduced a tax amnesty pro-
gram which ran from December 10, 1984 
to March 15, 1985.3 The primary purpose 
of this program as stated by the Califor-
nia Tax Franchise Board (CTFB) (Cali-
fornia Amnesty Program, 1986, p. 1) was 
to 
provide a number of far.reaching enforcement tools 
that significantly improved the state's ability to iden-
tify and collect tax obligations from individuals pre-
viously beyond the reach of traditional enforcement 
programs. 
Under this program, unpaid penalties and 
criminal prosecution were waived for 
qualified individuals. However, accrued 
taxes and interest charges were not for-
given. Those eligible for amnesty in-
cluded individuals who, for 1983 or an 
earlier tax year, had failed to file per-
sonal income tax returns, had filed inac-
curate returns, or were delinquent in 
paying their tax liabilities. Amnesty was 
not available to those already under 
criminal investigation. 
There were over 145,000 returns filed 
by about 85,000 individuals under this 
program, and roughly $154 million in gross 
revenue was produced. According to CTFB 
estimates this is $34.5 million more than 
what would have been collected through 
the traditional enforcement programs. 
Thus, in contrast to the experience of many 
other states, California was successful in 
generating a significant amount of net 
revenue. 
As noted above, revenue generation was 
not the sole objective of the California 
Amnesty Program, as it "was also ex-
pected to provide valuable information on 
characteristics of tax evaders and the 
methods used to evade taxes," (California 
Amnesty Program, 1986, p. 5). With this 
in mind, the CTFB identified amnesty re-
turns filed by individuals who were either 
not already known to the CTFB, or would 
not have been detected through normal 
enforcement procedures. The CTFB then 
drew a random sample from the amnesty 
returns submitted by individuals who had 
not originally filed in the year for which 
they claimed amnesty. Another sample 
was taken from the more than 7,000 re-
turns filed by those who amended their 
original returns under the program. For 
each of the 186 individuals in the latter 
sample, the CTFB combined the infor-
mation on the amended return with rel-
evant data taken from that taxpayer's 
original return. To ascertain the charac-
teristics of the individuals in these sam-
ples, the CTFB commissioned Sheffrin 
(1985) to conduct a descriptive study. 
Once this descriptive study was com-
pleted, the CTFB furnished us with these 
data. Because our objective is to conduct 
econometric analysis we focus on the 
sample of individuals who filed amended 
returns. This is required if we are to be 
consistent with standard theoretical eva-
sion models which derive comparative 
static results for the interior solution of 
partial income under-reporting, and to 
avoid corner solutions of complete hon-
esty and dishonesty. 
Prior to carrying out our econometric 
analysis, we examined the data for inter-
nal consistency. This involved recalculat-
ing the tax bill on both the original and 
amended returns of each of these 186 in-
dividuals. In the process we discovered a 
number of problem observations. These 
were primarily missing data, obvious tax-
payer or data entry errors, inability to 
duplicate tax calculations, and in a few 
cases no change or a drop in total tax li-
ability. After removing the observations 
with these problems, the sample size was 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XLIII 
reduced to 123 observations. We have no 
reason to suspect these omissions bias the 
sample. 
Of much greater concern is the proba-
ble bias due to the self-selected nature of 
the sample. Clearly, those evaders who 
voluntarily chose to participate in the 
amnesty program may not be represen-
tative of the population of California state 
income tax evaders as a whole. Fortu-
nately, while complicated, it is possible to 
deal with this type of self-selection bias 
econometrically. However, we postpone our 
discussion of the appropriate estimation 
procedure until after we have described 
our empirical model and the data to which 
it is applied. 
IV. Model Specification and 
Quantification 
As mentioned in Section II, theoretical 
tax evasion models generally express eva-
sion as a function of marginal tax rate, 
true income, penalty rate, and probability 
of detection. Of these, the most difficult to 
quantify has usually been the dependent 
variable measuring evasion. However, our 
amnesty dataset greatly simplifies this 
task. 
A. Measuring Evasion 
Because our sample includes informa-
tion taken from both the original returns 
and the amended returns filed under am-
nesty, construction of an evasion measure 
is straightforward. If we assume that the 
amended returns represent the "truth," we 
can simply compare the figures on these 
returns with their counterparts on the 
original returns. This is a plausible as-
sumption since it seems unlikely that one 
who has voluntarily admitted to evading 
on a particular tax return would turn 
around and file a false amended return. 
This is especially true in the case of the 
California Amnesty Program, given that 
it was publicly announced that the 
amended returns themselves may be au-
dited, that amnesty filers would be flagged 
for future reference, and that any infor-
mation received through the program 
would be available to the IRS. 
Of course, which figures are to be com-
pared depends upon how evasion is de-
fined. Evasion can take place in a number 
of ways. An individual may choose to un-
derreport his/her true income. He/she may 
also overstate adjustments in moving from 
Total Income to Adjusted Gross Income 
(AGI), or claim excessive deductions from 
AGI when calculating Taxable Income. 
Finally, once the tax liability associated 
with a given Taxable Income is deter-
mined, one can claim excessive credits 
against this tax liability when calculat-
ing his/her taxes owed.4 An individual 
may also choose to evade using any com-
bination of these methods. 
With our sample data we are able to 
construct measures for different combi-
nations of these forms of evasion. One 
measure, which reflects all of the above 
methods of evasion, is the amount of taxes 
evaded, calculated by subtracting taxes 
owed on the original return from taxes 
owed on the amended return. An alter-
native measure can be constructed by 
subtracting Taxable Income on the orig-
inal return from that on the amended re-
turn. This captures understatement of true 
income as well as overstatement of ad-
justments and deductions. We can also 
calculate a measure based on Adjusted 
Gross Income by subtracting the AGI fig-
ure reported on the original return from 
that on the amended return. This mea-
sure ignores any overstatement of deduc-
tions in moving from AGI to Taxable In-
come. Finally, we can measure pure 
underreporting of income by subtracting 
Total Income reported on the original re-
turn from Total Income on the amended 
return. 
These measures have a number of ad-
vantages. First and foremost, they are di-
rect measures of evasion in that they are 
based on actual individual tax returns. To 
date, only Clotfelter's (1983) study of the 
data from the 1969 Tax Compliance Mea-
surement Program (TCMP) has utilized 
such a direct measure at the individual 
level.5 Second, unlike the TCMP figures, 
the amnesty-based measures do not de-
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pend on the auditor's ability to detect 
evasion.6 Offsetting these advantages is 
the previously mentioned self-selection 
problem, which is discussed in Section V. 
B. Measuring the Determinants of 
Evasion 
Given our assumption that the tax-
payer is truthful when filing under am-
nesty, we use the information on the 
amended return for some of our indepen-
dent variables. In particular, we use the 
total income figure on the amended re-
turn as our measure of true income. Sim-
ilarly, the true marginal tax rate (rang-
ing from one to eleven percent) is 
calculated by applying the appropriate tax 
table to the taxable income reported on 
the amended return. 
As with most empirical analyses, our 
data place some restrictions on the extent 
to which we are able to directly control 
for other relevant factors. The fact that 
the sample is primarily cross-sectional, 
coupled with the uniformity of Califor-
nia's penalty rate across individuals and 
over the three-year sample period, means 
that no penalty rate can be included in 
the model. On the other hand, subjective 
assessment of the detection probability 
certainly varies across individuals, and it 
is at least conceptually possible to have a 
different value for each individual. 
In practice, however, reliable measures 
of this subjective probability are not typ-
ically available. A common alternative has 
been to use some measure of the objective 
audit probability as a proxy. With this in 
mind, we asked the Compliance Devel-
opment Liaison of the CTFB to provide us 
with an estimate of the probability that 
each of the original returns would have 
been audited under the audit selection 
rules in force at the time of filing. Un-
derstandably, the CTFB was not willing 
to disclose such sensitive information in 
detail. However, the Liaison did classify 
each original return as having had a high, 
medium or low probability of being au-
dited under the pre-amnesty regime. 
Therefore, we control for the detection 
probability using two dummy variables to 
distinguish the CTFB's medium and high 
classifications from the low. We recognize 
that these are less than ideal controls for 
the detection probability, but, after con-
siderable effort, we are convinced they are 
the best measures available to us.7 
In addition to the variables identified 
by theory, previous empirical evidence 
suggests that one should also control for 
such taxpayer characteristics as marital 
status and occupation. In all cases, these 
should reflect the conditions that existed 
at the time evasion took place. Therefore, 
we construct dummy variables for these 
characteristics using information taken 
from the original return.8 Of course, it 
would be desirable to include a wider range 
of socio-demographic characteristics such 
as taxpayers' age, race, and the like. 
However, data limitations preclude us from 
doing so. 
To summarize, our empirical model of 
income tax evasion alternatively uses 
Evaded Taxes (TAX GAP) , Taxable In-
come Gap (TIGAP), and Adjusted Gross 
Income Gap (AGIGAP) as the regres-
sand.9 All three regression equations use 
as primary regressors true income (Y) and 
marginal tax rate (MTR). Based on the 
standard evasion theory we expect the in-
come variable to have a positive sign. On 
the other hand, given our earlier discus-
sion of the tax rate effect, we have no sign 
expectation for the tax rate variable. The 
regression equations also include dummy 
control variables for probability of detec-
tion (MEDIUM, HIGH), occupation (MGRI 
PROF, SALES, CLERICAL), and marital 
status (MS). We expect the two probabil-
ity variables to have negative signs since 
the omitted category represents individ-
uals with low probability of being de-
tected. We have no clear sign expecta-
tions for the other dummy variables. 
V. Estimation Procedure 
Our objective is to estimate a regres-
sion equation of the following form 
Yi = Xi~ + Ui, i = 1,2, ... , n (1) 
where Yi is a measure of evasion, Xi is a 
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vector of the determinants of evasion, 13 
is a vector of unknown parameters, and 
Ui is a random error term with mean zero 
and variance ~. Because our sample is self 
selected, estimating (1) using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) would result in biased 
estimates and therefore an alternative 
approach must be employed. lO 
Correcting the selectivity bias in am-
nesty data is complicated by the fact that 
the sample is truncated; information is 
available on the evasion decision of those 
who participated in the amnesty pro-
gram, but there is no information what-
soever on nonparticipants. In this case, the 
proper estimation procedure requires 
knowledge of factors that influenced the 
decision of the evaders in our sample to 
participate in the amnesty program. If 
such factors can be identified, one can ob-
tain unbiased maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimates of the parameters of (1) using 
the following likelihood function (Mad-
dala, 1983, pp. 266-67), 
where Zi is a vector of factors influencing 
the participation decision, 0 is a vector of 
unknown parameters, <1>(-) is the distri-
bution function of the standard normal, f 
is the correlation coefficient between Ui and 
the error term of the participation func-
tion, and all other notations are as de-
fined previously.ll 
The term in the large bracket is the ra-
tio of the conditional probability of par-
ticipation in the amnesty program, given 
(Yi - Xil3), to the unconditional probabil-
ity of participation. The term outside of 
this bracket is the density function of (Yi 
- Xi l3). Thus the bias-correction proce-
dure involves scaling the density function 
of (Yi - Xil3) using the ratio of the two 
probabilities as weights. This procedure 
yields unbiased estimates for the param-
eters of the evasion model (the I3s), even 
though the estimates of the parameters of 
the participation function (the as) are un-
reliable. However, given that we are in-
terested in the former set of estimates, the 
unreliability of the estimates of 0 is no 
cause for concern. 
In order to apply this estimation pro-
cedure we need to specify the components 
of the vector Zi. In a recent article in this 
journal, Fisher, Goddeeris, and Young 
(1989) suggest that the decision to partic-
ipate in amnesty programs is influenced 
by the perceived increase in the post-am-
nesty penalty rate and probability of de-
tection.12 Here, as in our evasion model, 
we focus on the latter influence since we 
are unable to control for the effect of 
changes in the penalty rate given that our 
sample is cross-sectional, and the higher 
post-amnesty penalty rate applied uni-
formly to all individuals. 
The perceived increase in the probabil-
ity of detection is likely to depend upon 
what the individual can learn about the 
program. A good source of information is 
the amnesty legislation itself. The Cali-
fornia Amnesty Bill stated explicitly that, 
among other things, returns with self-em-
ployment income (Schedule C) and capi-
tal gains (Schedule D) would be targeted 
for intensified enforcement efforts after the 
amnesty period expired. Thus regardless 
of the form of evasion, an individual whose 
tax return included these schedules should 
have expected to face increased scrutiny 
post amnesty.13 Hence it is reasonable to 
assume that evaders with incomes from 
these sources were more likely to have 
participated in the program. To capture 
this effect, we create dummy variables to 
reflect the presence of these two sched-
ules in the individual's original return. 
Other factors not directly related to the 
amnesty program could also have contrib-
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uted to changes in the perceived proba-
bility of detection, thereby inducing par-
ticipation. A prime example would be a 
notice from the IRS of an impending au-
dit of the federal return. It seems likely 
that those evaders of California income 
taxes who had recently come under in-
vestigation by the IRS would have ex-
pected their probability of detection at the 
state level to have risen. In order to con-
trol for this effect, we construct a dummy 
variable indicating a positive response to 
an explicit question on the amended re-
turn regarding whether the participant 
was under IRS audit at the time of filing 
for state amnesty. 
To summarize, the participation deci-
sion is incorporated into the likelihood 
function (2) through the variables SCH-
C, SCH-D, and IRS-AUDIT. We recognize 
that this participation function is some-
what ad hoc and that we have probably 
oversimplified the complex participation 
decision. However, to date there has been 
no formal theoretical modeling of am-
nesty participation, and we are greatly 
constrained by data availability. 
VI. Estimation Results 
The maximum likelihood estimation 
results for each of our three measures of 
evasion are presented in Table 1.14 The 
top of each column of this table contains 
the mean value of the dependent vari-
able, the log of the likelihood function at 
the optimum, the calculated chi-squared 
statistic, and the estimated correlation 
coefficient between the error terms of the 
evasion and participation functions. These 
are followed by the estimated parameters 
of both the evasion and participation 
functions (i.e., the ~s and 8s in Equation 
2 above).15 
We begin our discussion of the results 
by noting that, based on the chi-squared 
statistics, each estimated equation is sta-
tistically significant. Next we consider the 
individual parameter estimates associ-
ated with the qualitative variables of the 
evasion function. The two dummy prob-
ability variables representing the CTFB's 
audit groupings have the expected nega-
tive signs, which would suggest that 
evaders with medium or high audit prob-
abilities tend to evade less than those with 
low probabilities. Further, as would be 
expected, the coefficient of HIGH is larger 
in absolute value than that of MEDIUM. 
However, since these estimates are never 
statistically significant, not much should 
be made of these results. 
The marital status variable is positive 
in all three equations and approaches sta-
tistical significance at conventional levels 
suggesting that, other things equal, mar-
ried taxpayers tend to evade more. This 
finding is consistent with some previous 
empirical work on the evasion problem 
(e.g., Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg, 
1978). Finally, of the occupational clas-
sifications, only the managerial/profes-
sional category has a t-ratio greater than 
unity in all three equations. It appears that 
in our sample either evasion does not vary 
across occupations, or more detailed oc-
cupational classifications are needed to 
capture whatever effect there may be. 
Turning to the quantitative variables, 
we find that true income has the expected 
positive sign and is statistically signifi-
cant in all equations, a finding consistent 
with all previous empirical evasion stud-
ies. More important for our purposes, 
however, is the fact that the marginal tax 
rate variable is positive and statistically 
significant at reasonable levels of confi-
dence in all three equations. This is in line 
with Clotfelter's (1983) finding, as well as 
with the popular contention that higher 
tax rates lead to increased evasion. It is 
also consistent with the usual microtheo-
retic prediction that the substitution ef-
fect of a change in relative prices typi-
cally outweighs the income effect.16 
Despite consistent results with respect 
to the sign and significance of income and 
tax rate across all equations, there is a 
clear difference in the magnitudes of these 
coefficients in Equation 1 compared to the 
other two equations. In particular, both 
coefficients are markedly smaller in 
Equation 1, reflecting the much smaller 
mean value of TAXGAP. 17 This high-
lights the conceptual difference between 
TAXGAP, which reflects taxes evaded, and 
the other measures of evasion which rep-
resent understatement of various types of 
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TABLE 1 
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION RESULTS 
(Absolute Value of Asymptotic t-Ratios in parentheses) 
EQUATION 1 EQUATION 2 EQUATION 3 
TAXGAP TIGAP AGIGAP 
MEAN 342.98 4265.60 4009.50 
LLF -924.15 -1211.26 -1216.57 
CHI-SQR 38.55 21. 32 23.70 
CORR. COEF. 0.04 -0.09 0.02 
TAX EVASION VARIABLES 
INTERCEPT -322.78 213 .02 8.31 
(2.00) (0.12) (0.007) 
INCOME 0.002 0.018 0.018 
(4.25 ) (3.46) (3.56) 
MTR 62.77 331.13 315.17 
(3.79) 0.85) (2.42) 
MEDIUM -33.48 -402.20 -666.42 
(0.37) (0.41) (0.68) 
HIGH -119.49 -618.60 -2222.14 
(0.38) (0.18) (0.64) 
MS 147.78 1635.57 1901.07 
(1. 56) (1. 59) (1. 96) 
MGR/PROF -124.30 -1501.10 -1253.66 
0.35) (1.51) (1.27) 
SALES -26.52 -776.02 -2363.89 
(0.10) (0.27) (0.83) 
CLERICAL 41.14 47.82 -761.02 
(0.22) (0.02) (0.38) 
AMNESTY PARTICIPATION VARIABLES 
INTERCEPT 4.47 5.40 4.60 
(0.032) (0.005) (0.003) 
IRS-AUDIT -0.004 0.05 0.24 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SCH-C 0.24 0.14 -0.16 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
SCH-D 0.41 -0.65 -0.23 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
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income. In light of these differences, a 
comparison of elasticities is more mean-
ingful. This also allows us to evaluate the 
relative effects of changes in true income 
and marginal tax rate on different mea-
sures of evasion. 
The estimates from Table 1 are con-
verted into elasticities using mean values 
and the results are reported in Table 2. 
Note that Equation 1 remains distinct from 
the other two, except that now it exhibits 
the largest relative effects with respect to 
both true income and marginal tax rate, 
whereas previously it displayed the 
smallest absolute effects. Table 2 also re-
veals that within each equation the tax 
rate elasticity is considerably larger than 
the income elasticity. However, with the 
exception of the tax rate elasticity in 
Equation 1, the evasion response to these 
two variables is inelastic. The large tax 
rate elasticity in Equation 1 may be at-
tributable to the fact that the TAXGAP 
reflects all types of evasion and thus cap-
tures the entire response to tax rate 
changes, while the other evasion mea-
sures only capture a portion of this re-
sponse. 
Before concluding, a few words regard-
ing the estimated parameters of the par-
ticipation function are in order. By usual 
standards, these estimates are quite poor. 
However, it is not clear what is to be made 
of the sign, significance, or magnitude of 
these coefficients; it is normally not pos-
sible to obtain reliable estimates for the 
participation parameters, even though 
their inclusion in the likelihood function 
corrects the selectivity bias. Thus the poor 
estimates of the participation parameters 
need not be a serious cause for concern. 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have studied the be-
havior of state income tax evaders who 
took advantage of the California Tax Am-
nesty Program. In the process, we have 
shown how amnesty data can be utilized 
to construct alternative measures of eva-
sion, and have demonstrated how exist-
ing econometric techniques can be used to 
deal with the inherent self-selection prob-
lem. Our findings support the popular 
contention that evaders respond to higher 
marginal tax rates by increasing their 
evasion activity. 
The results also confirm the theoretical 
prediction that individuals with higher 
levels of income tend to evade more. Fur-
ther, the absolute and relative sizes of both 
of these effects depend upon the scope of 
the evasion measure used. In particular, 
the absolute effects of income and tax rate 
changes are larger for the income-based 
measures of evasion, while the relative 
effects are larger for the tax-based mea-
sure of evasion. Finally, our results sug-
gest that evasion is generally inelastic 
with respect to changes in both true in-
come and marginal tax rates, but that tax 
rate elasticities are consistently larger 
than income elasticities. 
Analysis of evasion using amnesty data 
can be improved in a number of ways. 
First, more attention should be given to 
the participation function, including both 
formal modeling and use of better empir-
ical counterparts for the resulting argu-
ments. Second, amnesty data from other 
states should be examined to see if the re-
sults reported here can be substantiated. 
Third, the sensitivity of different types of 
TABLE 2 
ELASTICITIES OF VARIOUS MEASURES OF EVASION 
WITH RESPECT TO TRUE INCOME AND MARGINAL TAX RATE 
EVALUATED AT MEANS 
TAXGAP TIGAP AGIGAP 
Income (Y) 0.29 0.21 0.22 
Tax Rate (MTR) 1.50 0.64 0.65 
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evasion to enforcement-related variables 
should be examined, preferably, in a model 
that incorporates a more complete treat-
ment of the endogeneity problem associ-
ated with the detection probability. Fi-
nally, the possible interaction between 
state and federal income tax evasion 
should also be investigated. 
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lather factors have also been considered in this 
framework. These include the taxpayer's labor supply 
decision (e.g., Sandmo, 1981) and the progressivity of 
the tax system (e.g., Marchon, 1979). The conse-
quence has usually been to make the comparative 
static results even more ambiguous. 
'i'itzhaki (1974) showed that if taxes are propor-
tional and fines are levied on evaded taxes rather than 
evaded income, there would be no substitution effect. 
As a result, if risk aversion is decreasing with in-
come, the effect on evasion of a change in the tax rate 
is negative. 
"For a comparative survey of the general provisions 
of various states' amnesty programs see Mikesell 
(1986). 
4In addition to claiming excessive credits when cal-
culating the tax bill one can understate other taxes 
such as minimum tax on preference income or taxes 
on early withdrawals from Individual Retirement Ac-
counts. 
50ther studies have also used TCMP data but not 
at the individual level (e.g., Dubin and Wilde, 1988; 
Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Witte and Woodbury, 1985). 
6For more on the shortcomings of the TCMP data 
see Graetz and Wilde (1985). 
70ur audit classification dummies serve as instru-
mental variables for the detection probability, which 
is likely to be endogenous. However, because these 
probability measures can ultimately be traced back 
to the information contained in the returns, they too 
may be endogenous and, therefore, may not be good 
instruments. 
"Only broad occupational categories are available. 
These are: managers and professionals (MGR/pROF), 
salespersons (SALES), clerical workers (CLERICAL), 
and laborers (LABOR). LABOR is used for the base 
category. Marital status is represented by a dummy 
variable, (MS), identifying married taxpayers. 
"We will not estimate a model with Total Income 
Gap as the dependent variable. This would involve 
additional econometric problems as discussed in note 
11 below. 
lOFor a survey of the literature on the selectivity 
bias that arises from different types of self-selected 
samples, along with remedial procedures see Maddala 
(1983, Ch. 9). Also see Wainer (1986), especially the 
contribution by Heckman and Robb, pp. 63-107. 
"As mentioned in note 9, we do not estimate a model 
with Total Income Gap as dependent variable. This is 
because the self-selection correction procedure would 
be further complicated by the fact that there are many 
observations in our sample for which this variable is 
zero. 
l"They also discuss the role of personal guilt in this 
decision. 
l3The fact that the pre-amnesty probability of being 
audited might have depended on the presence of these 
two schedules does not undermine our line of reason-
ing. What we are arguing is that their presence in 
one's original return has an additional effect post am-
nesty. 
l4We also estimated these equations using OLS and 
obtained results that are qualitatively consistent with 
those reported in the text. Quantitatively, the param-
eter estimates for the amount of taxes evaded, 
TAXGAP, which captures all forms of evasion, were 
virtually identical to the ML results. Those for the 
first income-based measure, TIGAP, which ignores 
overstatement of tax credits, were modestly different. 
In contrast, the results of the AGIGAP, which reflects 
only misstatement of income and adjustments, are 
notably different from the corresponding ML esti-
mates. Evidently, the impact of the selectivity-bias 
correction procedure used here increases as the scope 
of the evasion measure narrows. 
l5We acknowledge that applying maximum likeli· 
hood to a sample of 123 observations may not gen-
erate the most robust results. 
l60ur finding that marginal tax rates are positively 
correlated with the level of evasion conflicts with the 
prediction from the game-theoretic models of tax eva-
sion (e.g., Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde, 1986). This 
may be due, in part, to our crude treatment of the 
probability of detection. On the other hand, as these 
authors have pointed out, the game-theoretic results 
are perhaps best interpreted as applying across a nar-
row range of income as within a particular audit class. 
As a result, their theoretical predictions and our em-
pirical results may not be directly comparable. 
l7The small mean value ofTAXGAP should not be 
taken as trivial. As a point of reference, consider that 
the average tax liability of the 1983 state income tax 
return was $769. 
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